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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FOR
EMPLOYEES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
HOW STATE COURTS HAVE CREATED
VARIATIONS ON FEDERALLY MANDATED
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Maribeth Wilt-Seibert*
Over the past sixty years, Congress has enacted a system of unemployment insurance for workers who have become unemployed
through no fault of their own. While the Social Security Act of 1935
created much of the statutory framework for this system of insurance, Congress did not include employees of educationalinstitutions
within its system of unemployment insurance until 1970, when it
amended the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1954 (FUTA). Since
Congress enacted those amendments, each of the fifty states has
passed legislation that substantiallyconforms to the FUTA amendments. Yet, despite the uniformity of state statutory language, state
appellate courts have interpreted the language in diverse and even
contradictoryways; a result that leaves uncertain the unemployment
insurance status of employees of educational institutions. This
Article surveys the diverse state court case law and emphasizes the

extent to which these varying interpretations fulfill--or fail to
fulfill-the congressional intent behind the FUTA amendments on
which the state legislatures based their statutory enactments. The
author concludes by recommending that the federal government
enact a system of statutory or regulatory monitoring, in order to
ensure the fulfillment of the congressional intent behind the FUTA
amendments.

INTRODUCTION

In the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress established the
United States system of unemployment insurance.' The program

*
Pennsylvania Supervisory Attorney, Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, Department of Labor and Industry. B.A. 1977, Pennsylvania State University;
J.D. 1980, Dickinson School of Law. I would like to thank Clifford F. Blaze, James K.
Bradley, Lea Judson, Stacy Bagley, and Michelle L. Klinger for their assistance in
preparing this Article. The opinions expressed in this Article are my own and have not
been approved, endorsed, or otherwise adopted by the Pennsylvania Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, the Department of Labor and Industry, or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
. 1.
Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 UoS.C. §§ 301-1397
(1994)); see ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1994).
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aimed, in part, to provide an initial line of economic defense for
working Americans who become unemployed through no fault
of their own.2 However, not until 1970 did the United States
Congress amend the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1954
(FUTA)3 to require the states to pay unemployment compensation benefits to employees of educational institutions and educational service agencies when these employees met the FUTA's
criteria.4 Since 1970, in an effort to remain in conformity with
the FUTA, each of the fifty states has enacted nearly identical
versions of the federally mandated language. 5 While the language in each statute is nearly identical, the interpretations of
that language by the state appellate courts have been diverse
and even contradictory.' This Article focuses on the diverse

2.

See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 1, at 3.

3.
Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 439 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3311 (1994)).
4.
Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3309 (1994)).
5.
See ALA. CODE § 25-4-70 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.381(e) (1990); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-750(E) (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-509 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993);
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253.3 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73107(3) (1986 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-227 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 3314(6) (1985 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-110(7) (1981); FLA. STAT. ch.
443.091(3) (1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-196 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 383-29(b) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(q) (1989 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
820, para. 405/612 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE § 22-4-14-7 (1992); IOWA
CODE § 96.4(5) (1984 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(i)-(k) (1993); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 341.360 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(6)(a)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1192-7 (West 1988); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8-909 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 28A (1994);
MICH. COmp. LAwS ANN. § 421.27 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.08(6) (West 1992
& Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-511(h) (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.040-3 (1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-2108 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-628(h) (1993 & Supp. 1994);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 612.434 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:31-II
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4(g) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-15(C)(2) (Michie 1978); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 590(10)-(11) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 96-13(b)(1) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(9)-(12) (1989 & Supp. 1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(I)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 2-209 (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 657.167-.221 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 802.1 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-68 (Michie 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-20 (Law.
Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 61-6-1.2, -1.3, -1.6, -1.7 (1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-7-302(b)(3) (Michie 1991); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 207.041, 207.076 (West
Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-405(8) (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1343(c)
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-615 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.44.050 (1994); W. VA.
CODE § 21A-6-15 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(17) (West 1988); WYO. STAT. § 27-3-308
(Michie 1991).
6.
Compare Friedlander v. Employment Div., 676 P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirming a finding by the Employment Appeals Board that claimant had reasonable
assurance of continued employment where his status was contingent upon minimum
student enrollment) with In re Jama, 467 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (affirming
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judicial responses to this language and the extent to which
appellate interpretation conforms with federal legislative intent,
suggesting how these varying interpretations may be reconciled
with the legislative intent behind the federal statutory amendments. In particular, this Article discusses the amendments to
the FUTA that provide for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to employees of educational institutions and
surveys the state court interpretations of important statutory
language. This Article recommends the adoption of the interpretations of the federal language that best serve the legislative
intent behind the FUTA amendments.

I. BACKGROUND

The FUTA permits employers to take a credit against federal
taxes for contributions required to be paid into a state unemployment compensation fund if the state's unemployment compensation statute conforms with federal specifications.7 In 1970,
the federal government amended the FUTA to require state
legislatures to amend their unemployment compensation statutes
to provide for the payment of unemployment compensation
benefits to employees of institutions of higher education.8 This
amendment aimed to permit the employees of institutions of
higher education to enjoy the same kind of unemployment
insurance protection provided to management personnel in
private industry.9 However, the amendment does not provide for
the payment of unemployment compensation benefits between
academic terms or years, or to employees who work in an
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity and
have contracted to return to work.' ° The exception eliminates
the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to

a decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that claimant did not have
a reasonable assurance of continued employment where her status was dependent upon
adequate student enrollment).
7.
26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1994).
8.
Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3309 (1994)).
9.
See S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3606, 3620.
10.
26 U.S.C. § 3309 (1994).
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employees who can plan for temporary unemployment and thus
do not truly suffer from economic insecurity."
In 1976, Congress again amended the FUTA to extend unemployment compensation to employees of elementary and secondary schools. 2 The 1976 amendment also denied compensation
coverage between academic terms or years to elementary and
secondary school employees who work in an instructional,
research, or principal administrative capacity and have a
reasonable assurance of returning to work. 3 Additionally, the
1976 amendment permitted the states to deny benefits to
employees of elementary and secondary schools who are employed in other capacities, so long as they have a reasonable
assurance of returning to work.' 4 In a report on the proposed
language, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference defined reasonable assurance as "a written, verbal,
or implied agreement that the employee will perform services
in the same capacity during the ensuing academic year or
term.'
In 1977, Congress again amended the FUTA to permit the
denial of benefits during established or customary vacation
periods or holiday recesses to all employees employed in an
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity in
institutions of higher education and to employees working in any
capacity in elementary and secondary schools.' 6 The 1977
amendment also permitted the denial of unemployment compensation benefits between academic terms or years and during
established or customary vacation periods and holiday recesses
to employees of educational service agencies. 7 Congress included
educational service agencies in the 1977 amendment to prevent
the collection of benefits by employees who are employed by a
central state agency and who provide specialized services to
educational institutions. 18
11.
See, e.g., Haynes v. Commonwealth, 442 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Pa. 1982) (providing
school employees during summer months or scheduled vacations as examples).
12.
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90
Stat. 2667 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994)); see also Thomas A. Rayer,
Update on Unemployment Compensation, 25 CATH. LAW. 282 (1980) (discussing the

implications of the 1976 FUTA amendments).
13.
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994).
14.
Id.
15.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1745, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6032, 6036.
16.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-19, § 302, 91 Stat. 39, 44 (1977) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994)).
17.
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994).
18.
S. REP. No. 456, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5-6 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3579, 3581, 3583-84.
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In 1982, Congress passed an amendment that enabled states
to deny benefits to employees of educational institutions employed in capacities other than instructional, research, or
principal administrative during established or customary vacation periods or holiday recesses. 9 The language of the FUTA also
requires the retroactive payment of benefits to nonprofessionals
who were denied benefits if, in fact, they were not offered work
in the following academic year or term.2 °
Finally, the 1983 amendment to the FUTA required states to
deny benefits to all employees of educational institutions and
educational service agencies between academic years or terms
and during established or customary vacation periods or holiday
recesses.2 1 The federal language also permitted states to deny
unemployment compensation benefits to any employee performing services for or on behalf of an educational institution.2 2

19.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 193, 96
Stat. 408-09 (1982) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994)).
20.
Id.
21.
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 521, 97 Stat. 65,
147-48 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994)).
22.
42 US.C. § 3304 (1994). Thus, the federally mandated statutory language, as
it currently appears, is as follows:
(a) Requirements.-The Secretary of Labor shall approve any State law submitted
to him, within 30 days of such submission, which he finds provides that-

(6)(A) compensation is payable on the basis of service to which section 3309(a)(1)
applies, in the same amount, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions
as compensation payable on the basis of other service subject to such law; except
that(i) with respect to services in an instructional, research, or principal administrative
capacity for an educational institution to which section 3309(a)(1) applies,
compensation shall not be payable based on such services for any week commencing
during the period between two successive academic years or terms (or, when an
agreement provides instead for a similar period between two regular but not
successive terms, during such period) to any individual if such individual performs
such services in the first of such academic years (or terms) and if there is a contract
or reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such
capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or
terms,
(ii) with respect to services in any other capacity for an educational institution to
which section 3309(a)(1) applies(I) compensation payable on the basis of such services may be denied to any
individual for any week which commences during a period between 2 successive
academic years or terms if such individual performs such services in the first of
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW: IRRECONCILABLE
VARIATIONS IN THE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL LANGUAGE

After each of the fifty states enacted the federally mandated
language requiring states to pay unemployment benefits to
employees of educational institutions,2 3 unless those employees
had a reasonable assurance of returning to work, the states
developed two types of reasonable assurance cases. One type
concerns whether an employee has reasonable assurance for
purposes of entitlement under the law. 24 The second type focuses

such academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such
individual will perform such services in the second of such academic years or terms,
except that
(I) if compensation is denied to any individual for any week under subclause (I)
and such individual was not offered an opportunity to perform such services for
the educational institution for the second of such academic years or terms, such
individual shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of the compensation for each
week for which the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which
compensation was denied solely by reason of subclause (I),
(iii) with respect to any services described in clause (i) or (ii), compensation payable
on the basis of such services shall be denied to any individual for any week which
commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess
if such individual performs such services in the period immediately before such
vacation period or holiday recess and there is a reasonable assurance that such
individual will perform such services in the period immediately following such
vacation period or holiday recess,
(iv) with respect to any services described in clause (i) or (ii), compensation payable
on the basis of services in any such capacity shall be denied as specified in clauses
(i), (ii), and (iii) to any individual who performed such services in an educational
institution while in the employ of an educational service agency, and for this
purpose the term "educational service agency" means a governmental agency or
governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose
of providing such services to one or more educational institutions,
(v) with respect to services in which section 3309(a)(1) applies, if such services are
provided to or on behalf of an educational institution, compensation may be denied
under the same circumstances as described in clauses (i) through (iv) ....
Id. § 3304(a)(6)(A).
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. E.g., Allen v. State Dep't of Labor, 658 P.2d 1342, 1345-46 (Alaska 1983); August
v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 438 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Mass. 1982); Rieske v.
Grand Rapids Pub. Sch., 376 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Goralski v.
Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 408 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Pa.
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on what circumstances will result when no reasonable assurance
exists.25 While the state courts generally agree on whether an
employee has reasonable assurance, they have interpreted the
consequential circumstances when reasonable
assurance exists
26
in diverse, and even contradictory, ways.
In cases involving the first type of reasonable assurance issue,
state courts determine whether employees of educational institutions have a reasonable assurance of returning to work only
after the courts have examined the totality of the employment
relationship.27 Courts have defined reasonable assurance as a
written, verbal, or implied agreement that the employee of the
educational institution will return to work following the period
between two academic years or terms, or following a vacation
period or holiday recess." As a result, while an employee who
has a written or verbal contract to return to work has a reasonable assurance of returning to work,29 an employee who does not
have a written or verbal contract to return to work may also
have a reasonable assurance of returning to work. 0 Where no
contract exists, the employee's reasonable assurance arises out

1979); Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 426 A-2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
25.
E.g., Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. Falkenstern, 425 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988); In re Barton, 510 N.Y.S.2d 38,39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); In re Laudadio, 485
N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
26.
E.g., Ortiz v. New Mexico Employment Sec. Dep't, 731 P.2d 1357, 1359 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986); Barton, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
27.
E.g., Employment Div. v. Epstein, 752 P.2d 1295 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
28.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1344-45 (finding an agreement where a bilingual
instructor had a heavy workload and there was no indication that she would not be
rehired); Prosser v. Everett, 631 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Ark. 1982) (finding no assurance where
there was no contract or promise of contract); Denver Pub. Sch. v. Industrial Comm'n,
644 P.2d 83, 85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding adequate assurance existed where a form
indicated that claimant's name would be placed on the substitute teacher list for the
fall term); Redmond v. Employment Div., 675 P.2d 1126, 1128-29 (Or. 1984) (finding
no agreement where the decision to reemploy was contingent on student registration).
29.
E.g., Caldwell v. Carswell, 280 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 1981) (holding that a teacher
was not entitled to benefits during the period between contracts where the second
contract had been signed before the first contract had expired); McCuen v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 486 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1985) (holding that a teacher
has reasonable assurance where her name has been placed on a substitute list and where
the teacher has been informed of such placement); Jennings v. Employment Sec. Dep't,
663 P.2d 849 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the term reasonable assurance does
not require a guarantee of work, only a good faith expectation on the part of the school
board); Davenport v. Gatson, 451 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that a contract need
not specify the number of days to be worked in order to give reasonable assurance to
substitute teacher).
30.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1345; Riekse v. Grand Rapids Pub. Sch., 376 N.W.2d
194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Epstein, 752 P.2d at 1297.
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of an implied agreement to continue employment. 3 ' State courts
have found an implied agreement to continue employment
32
where the employee has a past history of returning to work;
where the employee receives a letter indicating that the em33
ployee has a reasonable assurance of returning to work;
where the employee receives no notification that the employee
will not be rehired;34 where the employee receives notice of
recommendation for employment;35 where the employee has
been offered training;31 where the employee receives a verbal
assurance that she will receive an offer of employment; 37 where
the employer expects to recall the employee and the employer
has job openings; 38 where the employee completes an applica40
tion for employment;3 9 where the employee returns to work;
where the employee expects to return to work;4 where the
employee desires reemployment; 42 where there exists objective
evidence of a commitment between an employee and the educa-

31.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1345; August v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,
438 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Mass. 1982); McCuen, 486 A.2d at 555; Goralski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 408 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Pa. 1979); Neshaminy Sch.
Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 426 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Commw.

Ct. 1981).
32.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1345; August, 438 N.E.2d at 327; Riekse, 376 N.W.2d
at 195; McCuen, 486 A.2d at 555; Goralski, 408 A.2d at 1180; Neshaminy Sch. Dist.,
426 A.2d at 1247.
33.
E.g., Garrison v. Department of Economic Sec., 750 P.2d 1370, 1371 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988); August, 438 N.E.2d at 328; Riekse, 376 N.W.2d at 195; In re Miller, 431
N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Hansen v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 422 A.2d 707, 708 (Pa. 1980); Baker v. Department of Employment &
Training Bd. of Review, 637 A.2d 360, 361 (R.I. 1994); Jennings, 663 P.2d at 851.
34.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1344.
35.
E.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 481 A.2d 128, 131 (D.C. App. 1984); August, 438 N.E.2d at 329; In re Aleid, 530 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
36.
E.g., Allen, 658 P.2d at 1345; Indianapolis Pub. Sch. v. Review Bd. of the
Employment Sec. Div., 473 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Riekse, 376 N.W.2d
at 195.
37.
E.g., Gilbert v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 421 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Vt. 1980).
38.
E.g., Baker v. Department of Employment Training Bd. of Review, 637 A.2d
360, 365 (R.I. 1994).
39.
Cf Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 473 N.E.2d 155, 158 (holding that notice of, and
application for, available substitute teaching positions and an invitation to a training
workshop constitute reasonable assurance); Riekse, 376 N.W.2d at 195 (finding
reasonable assurance where a teacher submitted an application, attended an in-service
meeting, and had worked two days for her employer).
40.
See Riekse, 376 N.W.2d at 195.
41.
E.g., Herrera v. Industrial Comm'n of the State, 593 P.2d 329, 331 (Colo.
1979); In re Miller, 431 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Goralski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 408 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Pa. 1979).
42.
Cf Denver Pub. Sch. v. Industrial Cornm'n of the State, 644 P.2d 83 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982) (finding reasonable assurance where the employee desired reemployment
and the employer made verbal assurances of future employment).
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tional institution to employ the employee in the next academic
year;43 and, finally, for substitute employees only, where the
employer or the employee
places the employee's name on the
44
list.
employee
substitute
Courts have based reasonable assurance on the employer's
good faith if both the employer and the employee expect the
employment relationship to continue.4 5 Some state courts
require mutuality of commitment between the employer and
the employee for reasonable assurance to exist,4 6 while other
state courts do not require such mutuality.4" Even within a
single state, courts have, at times, required mutuality of
commitment between the employer and the employee for
reasonable assurance to exist,48 but on other occasions have not
required such commitment.4 9 Most states, however, seem to
agree that no reasonable assurance exists when employees
have resigned from their employment.5"
With regard to the second type of case law regarding reasonable assurance, the state courts have developed diverse and
contradictory interpretations as to the circumstances under
which reasonable assurance may or may not exist. Some state
courts have held that assurance given is not reasonable if not

43.
E.g., Goralski, 408 A.2d at 1180.
44.
E.g., Garrison v. Department of Economic Sec., 750 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988); Denver Pub. Sch., 644 P.2d at 84; Mogren v. State Employment Sec. Bd.,
801 P.2d 64, 67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); In re Luchum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992); In re Miller, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 726; Hansen v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 422 A.2d 707, 707 (Pa. 1980); Goralski, 408 A.2d at 1180; Perry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 475 A.2d 950, 952 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984);
Jennings v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 663 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
45.
E.g., Garrison, 750 P.2d at 1373; Samuels v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 680 P.2d
764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); Jennings, 663 P.2d at 852.
46.
E.g., Redmond v. Employment Div., 675 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 1984);
Friedlander v. Employment Div., 676 P.2d 314, 318 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
47.
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Employment Div., 832 P.2d 1233, 1234-35 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) (declining explicitly to determine whether mutual commitment is needed).
48.
E.g., Guth v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 473 A.2d 228, 230
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Aronson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 424
A.2d 972, 974 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
49.
E.g., Seeherman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 423 A.2d
1129, 1131 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
50.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Employment Appeal Bd., 441 N.W.2d 766, 767-68 (Iowa
1989) (holding that the statute's "reasonable assurance" exception to providing
unemployment compensation does not apply to a teacher who resigned after receiving
notification that her contract would not be renewed); Abel v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 517 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (finding no reasonable
assurance where a teacher resigned after being placed on a daily substitute teacher
list).
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given in good faith.5 1 For example, California has enacted a
provision in its unemployment compensation code which provides that an agreement contingent upon enrollment, funding,
52
or program changes does not reasonably assure employment.
As a result, California case law has held that reasonable assurance may not be contingent on adequate class enrollment,5 3 but
may be conditioned on adequate funding.'
While no other states have enacted a statutory provision
similar to California's, some state courts have held that both
funding and enrollment may be considered when deciding
whether an employee has a reasonable assurance of returning
to work.55 For example, a Michigan court has held that, regardless of the fact that an employee received a reasonable
assurance letter from the state Employment Security Commission, the Board of Review must consider whether the employer
was in financial crisis, whether employees received layoff
notices, whether the student population had declined, whether
federal funding was reduced, and whether the employer's
budget was reduced before concluding that an employee's
assurance of returning to work was in fact reasonable.56 Similarly, New York courts have held that whether an employee
had a reasonable assurance of returning to work is subject to
the "sufficiency of [student] registration, financial ability, and
curriculum needs."5 7 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held
that employees do not have a reasonable assurance of returning to work where the reasonable assurance is contingent
upon funding.5 8 Finally, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has
held that where an employee has been informed that she

51.
E.g., Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. Falkenstern, 425 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988).
52.
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253.3(f) (West 1986).
53.
Cervisi v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 256 Cal. Rptr. 142, 144
(1989).
54.
Compare Russ v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 178 Cal. Rptr.
421,429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding reasonable assurance where an employee routinely was terminated each spring and reemployed each fall, even though funding had not
been secured, where this cyclical pattern had persisted for several years) with Farrell
v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 433 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Wis. 1988) (holding that an
offer of employment conditioned on funding did not constitute reasonable assurance).
55.
Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. Falkenstern, 425 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); In re Barton, 510 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); In re Laudadio, 485

N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
56. Falkenstern,425 N.W.2d at 129-32.
57.

See In re Barton, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 39; In re Laudadio, 485 N.YS.2d at 658.

58.

Farrell,433 N.W.2d at 273.
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likely will be discharged for lack of funds, the employee has no
reasonable assurance of returning to work.5 9
Some courts have held that an employee may have reasonable assurance where such assurance depends upon minimum
student enrollment because the employer has met the minimum student enrollment requirement in the past.60 However,
the New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania courts have held
that employees do not have reasonable assurance of returning
to work where the reasonable assurance is contingent upon
past enrollment.6
In direct contradiction to the above line of cases, other state
courts have held that an employee has reasonable assurance of
returning to employment, despite the uncertainty of funding
for the employee's position. 2 Specifically, the Supreme Court
of North Dakota found that reasonable assurance exists for a
public employee, even though the employee received a letter
that federal funding was uncertain, because "[flunding by a
legislative body, by its very nature, is not static but always
uncertain."" Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals has
held that, under certain circumstances, an employee still has
reasonable assurance of returning to work, notwithstanding
the contingency of funding, so long as the employer communicated to the employee its expectation of reemployment. 4 As a
result, depending on the state, employees may or may not be
held to have reasonable assurance of returning to work where
the reasonable assurance depends upon enrollment, funding,
or program changes.

59.
Olson v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 309 N.W.2d 325, 325-26 (Minn. Ct. App.
1981).
60.
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Employment Div., 676 P.2d 314, 318-19 (Or. App.
1984) ("That his classes had drawn sufficient enrollment to be held in the past makes
it reasonable to expect that they would be [held] again and supports a determination
that he had reasonable assurances of employment in the fall . . ").
61.
See In re Jama, 467 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Redmond v. Employment Div., 675 P.2d 1126, 1128-29 (Or. App. 1984); Langer v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 407 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Conmmw. Ct. 1979).
62.
See, e.g., Goeller v. Job Serv. of N.D., 425 N.W.2d 925, 927-28 (N.D. 1988)
(holding that a teacher had reasonable assurance of reemployment where the employer indicated the uncertainty of funding but that it intended to continue its "present
staffing pattern").
63.
Id. at 928.
64.
Samuels v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 680 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
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A. "In Any Such Capacity"

Upon a determination that an employee has a reasonable
assurance of returning to work, an employee still will not be
disqualified from receiving benefits unless there exists a reasonable assurance that the employee will perform services "in
any such capacity."6 5 The meaning of the phrase "in any such
capacity" also has been subject to diverse interpretations by
the state courts.66
Initially, "in any such capacity" has, as its logical antecedent, the phrase "in an instructional, research, or principal
administrative capacity." 67 As a result, Pennsylvania courts
have held that where, in the first of two successive academic
terms or years, an employee has been employed in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity and
has a reasonable assurance of employment in any one of those
three capacities in the second year or term, the employee has
a reasonable assurance of employment "in any such capacity."68 Further, the Court of Appeals of Iowa has held that
where an employee has a reasonable assurance of returning to
work for a shortened academic term with reduced work reasquirements and pay, the employee still has a reasonable
69
surance of returning to work "in any such capacity."
At first, the New York courts similarly held that where
teachers who had taught full-time during the first academic
year were given reasonable assurance of returning to work
during the second academic year through the placement of
their name on a substitute teacher list, they were disqualified
from receiving benefits because they had reasonable assurance

65.

See 42 US.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994); accord Board of Educ. v. Unemploy-

ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 609 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
66.

See, e.g., In re Abramowitz, 550 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y App. Div. 1989) (finding

a claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation where she had been dismissed
from one position but continued to hold another because she experienced no decrease
in earnings); In re Wilson, 438 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (finding a
claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation where she was reinstated as a
substitute teacher after one year as a full-time teacher).
67.
26 US.C. § 3304(6)(A)(i) (1994).

68.

E.g., Board of Educ. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 609 A.2d

at 600; Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 426
A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).

69.
Merged Area (Educ.) VII v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 367 N.W.2d 272, 275
(Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
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of returning to work "in any such capacity."70 In 1986, however, the federal government issued a program letter providing
that:
[an offer of employment is not bona fide if only a possibility of employment exists, and reasonable assurance exists only if the economic terms and conditions of the job
offered in the second period are not substantially less than
the terms and conditions of the job in the first period.7 '
In response to this letter, New York courts held that, where
the economic terms and conditions of the offered employment
were substantially less than those provided during the previous academic term, the employee did not have a reasonable
assurance of returning to work "in any such capacity."7 2 However, if the economic terms and conditions were the same or
better in the second academic term or year, the employee did
have a reasonable assurance of returning to work "in any such
capacity" and would, therefore, be ineligible for benefits.7 v
Prior to this program letter, most other states had already
determined that where the economic terms and conditions of
the job offered in the second term or year were substantially
less than those during the first period, the employee did not
have a reasonable assurance of returning to employment "in
any such capacity."7 4 Initially, Oregon courts held that the
phrase "in any such capacity" meant that the employee would
perform the same instructional, research, or administrative
functions as during the previous year.75 Later, the Court of
Appeals of Oregon held that the phrase meant that the terms
and conditions of the employment for the following year must

70.
E.g., In re Silverman, 440 N.YS.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); In re
Wilson, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
71.
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 4-87 (Dec. 24, 1986).
72.
E.g., In re Abramowitz, 550 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); In re
Abbott, 524 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
73.
E.g., In re Abramowitz, 550 N.YS.2d at 76.
74.
E.g., Fort Wayne Community Sch. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 428 N.E.2d 1379, 1385 (Ind. 1981); Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 535,
291 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1980); Sulat v. Board of Review, 424 A.2d 451, 453-54
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Ash v. Board of Review, 497 N.E.2d 724, 728 (Ohio
1986); Kelly v. Employment Div., 701 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Abulhosn
v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 722 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1986); Leissring v. Dep't of Indus.,

Labor and Human Relations, 340 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis. 1983).
75.

E.g., Mallon v. Employment Div., 599 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
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be "reasonably similar" to those of the previous year.7 6 The
court reasoned that the intent of the statute was to prevent
subsidized summer vacations for teachers employed during
consecutive academic years but was not meant to apply to
continued employment at a substantially lower rate of pay.77
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that
employees are ineligible for benefits during the period between
academic terms or years only where they have received a
reasonable written assurance of reemployment in the second
term or year under terms that approximate those of the previous term or year.78
Following the foregoing decisions, courts in five additional
states held that full-time teachers do not have a reasonable
assurance of returning to work "in any such capacity" where
79
their names have been placed on substitute teacher lists.
One New Jersey court reasoned that the phrase "in any such
capacity" contemplates the continuation of full-time services
under an actual contract in a similar capacity, and not the
continuation of services from day-to-day. 0 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin also held that the phrase "in any such capacity"
precludes an employee from collecting unemployment compensation benefits only if the employee had a reasonable assurance of performing services in the following year in an
instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity
with reasonably similar terms and conditions as those in the
preceding year. x In response to that decision, the Wisconsin
legislature amended its statute, changing the phrase "in any
such capacity" to "such services." 2 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin then held that, under the terms of the amended
statute, an employee who had worked a full academic year,
but would return to work for only the first semester of the
second academic year, did not have a reasonable assurance of

76.
Kelly, 701 P.2d at 450.
77.
Id. at 450-51.
78.
Johnson, 291 N.W.2d at 701.
79.
Fort Wayne Community Sch. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
428 N.E.2d 1379, 1385 (Ind. 1981); Sulat v. Board of Review, 424 A.2d 451, 454 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Ash v. Board of Review, 497 N.E.2d 724, 728 (Ohio 1986);
Abulhosn v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 722 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Wash. 1986); Leissring v.
Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 340 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Wis. 1983).
80.
Sulat, 424 A.2d at 453-54.
81.
Leissring, 340 N.W.2d at 539.
82.
See Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Labor and
Indus. Review Comm'n, 456 N.W.2d 162, 166 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
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returning to work because the employee would not be employed under the same terms and conditions.8 3 In other words,
the court interpreted "such services" to mean the same terms
and conditions of employment upon return.
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a fulltime contract teacher offered work in the following academic
year with decreased salary, no paid holidays, no sick leave,
and less medical coverage than during the previous academic
year did not have a reasonable assurance of returning to work
in the same or similar capacity. 4 The Court of Appeals of Illinois further construed the language "in any such capacity" to
hold that, where a counselor worked four hours per day, five
days per week, in addition to substitute teaching during the
first academic year, and then was separated from this employment and offered only substitute teaching during the second
academic year, there was no reasonable assurance of being
employed "in any such capacity" because the employee was not
employed in the same or similar capacity.8 5
With respect to substitute teachers, state courts generally
have held that employees who worked as substitute teachers
during the first academic term or year and have a reasonable
assurance of returning to work as a substitute teacher in the
second academic term or year are ineligible for unemployment
compensation benefits because the substitute has been offered
work in the same or similar capacity.8 6 However, some substitute employees may begin their first academic term or year as
day-to-day substitute employees and then, at some point during
the school year, may become long-term substitute employees.
State courts are divided on whether long-term substitutes offered a reasonable assurance to return to work as day-to-day
substitutes are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
The majority of state courts have held that where long-term
substitutes have a reasonable assurance of returning to work as

83.
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Wisconsin Labor
and Indus. Review Comm'n, 467 N.W.2d 545, 552-53 (Wis. 1991).

84.
85.

Paynes v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 388 N.W2d 358, 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
Whitley v. Board of Review, 451 N.E.2d 942, 942 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983).

86.
E.g., Denver Pub. Sch. v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 83, 84 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); Davis v. Department of Employment Serv., 481 A.2d 128, 131 (D.C. 1984);
Indianapolis Pub. Sch. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 473 N.E.2d 155,
158 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985); Mogren v. Kansas Employment Sec. Bd., 801 P.2d 64, 67 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1990); Riekse v. Grand Rapids Pub. Sch., 376 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985); In re Luchum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 217, 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); In re Miller, 431
N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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day-to-day substitutes, the substitutes are ineligible for benefits
because they are being offered a reasonable assurance of returning to similar employment. 87 For example, the Washington Court
of Appeals denied benefits to a long-term substitute who had a
reasonable assurance of returning to work as a day-to-day substitute. 88 The court reasoned that although placement on the
substitute list was not in itself reasonable assurance, the school
district in good faith expected to offer substitute work to the
teachers and had communicated that expectation to them.89
Since the claimants had received a reasonable assurance letter,
were placed on the substitute list, and had signed a substitute
teacher contract, they had received reasonable assurance of
returning to work.9" Finally, the Court of Appeals of Oregon has
suggested that, where a day-to-day substitute teacher received
reasonable assurance of returning to work from only three out
of five school districts for the following year, the teacher had a
reasonable assurance of returning to work in the same or
similar capacity. 9'

Pennsylvania courts continue to construe strictly the statutory
language that denies benefits during the summer months to
employees who work full time during the first academic term or
year and were offered only substitute employment in the second
academic term or year. 92 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania has construed the statute liberally to grant benefits during vacation
periods and holiday recesses to employees who have received unemployment compensation benefits prior to a break in academic
terms or years, or prior to a vacation period or holiday recess,
if they are receiving benefits based on full-time employment in
their base year, even though they may have a reasonable
assurance of returning to work, because these employees are
truly unemployed during the vacation period or holiday recess.93
87. E.g., Patrick v. Board of Review, 409 A.2d 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979);
Johnson v. Brunswick City Sch. Dist., 492 N.E.2d 1252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Slominski
v. Employment Div., 711 P.2d 215 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Preziosi v. Department of
Employment Sec., 529 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1987).
88.
Jennings v. Employment Sec., 663 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 851.
91.
Employment Div. v. De Leon, 747 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
92. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 609 A.2d
596 (Pa. 1992); Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
426 A.2d 1245 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
93. E.g., Albert Gallatin Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
632 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); West Greene Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 535 A.2d 697, 700 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Soliman v.
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In justifying the granting of unemployment compensation
benefits to employees who have a reasonable assurance of
returning to work, the Pennsylvania courts have held that the
federal language intends to eliminate the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to employees who can plan for
non-working periods and who, therefore, do not truly suffer from
the economic insecurity which unemployment compensation
coverage is intended to alleviate.9 4 One court has concluded that
since full-time employees may not anticipate being reduced to
part-time or day-to-day employment, these employees remain
eligible to receive benefits.9 5 However, that court declined to
grant benefits to a day-to-day substitute receiving benefits prior
to a vacation period where the benefits were based on the
substitute's day-to-day earnings, not on previous full-time
earnings, and the employee had a reasonable assurance of
returning to the same earnings after the vacation period.9"
In contrast to the Pennsylvania courts, the New York and
Oregon courts have concluded that base-year wages are not
relevant to determining benefit eligibility for any employee who
has a reasonable assurance of returning to work. v Under this
interpretation, if an employee is reasonably assured of returning
to the same or similar terms and conditions of employment, the
employee remains ineligible for benefits regardless of his fulltime base-year wages.98
More recently, however, the Oregon Court of Appeals has
changed its position to hold that base-year wages are relevant
in determining whether an employee with reasonable assurance

Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 531 A.2d 819, 821 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987);
Hopewell Area Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 528 A.2d 1082,
1084 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Snow v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 505
A.2d 383, 384 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1986); Reskowski v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 505 A.2d 380, 382 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Coolidge v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 499 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Weirich v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 496 A.2d 97, 99 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985);
Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 442 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982).
94.
Hopewell, 528 A.2d at 1083; Coolidge, 499 A.2d at 410; Haynes, 442 A.2d at
1233.
95.
Albert GallatinSch. Dist., 632 A.2d at 616-17.
96.
Foremskyv. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 496 A.2d 865,866-67
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
97.
E.g., In re Abramowitz, 550 N.YS.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Employment
Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Currin, 749 P.2d 609,611 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Johnson
v. Employment Div., 651 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
98.
See In re Abramowitz, 550 N.YS.2d at 76; Currin, 749 P.2d at 610; Johnson,
651 P.2d at 1368.
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of returning to the same or similar terms and conditions of
employment remains eligible for benefits. 99 The court held that
an employee with full-time employment in the base year, who
was receiving partial unemployment compensation benefits
while working part time during the following year, remained
eligible for benefits during the summer recess. 00 The court
reasoned that since the employee's benefits were based on her
full-time work, rather than on her part-time employment, the
employee remained eligible for benefits during the summer.'
Furthermore, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held that
where an employee has full-time base-year wages and has a
reasonable assurance of returning only to day-to-day substitute
work, that reasonable assurance does not preclude granting
benefits during a holiday recess where those benefits were based
on previous full-time employment.0 2 Wisconsin apparently has
adopted part of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rationale by
holding that full-time base-year wages are relevant in determining unemployment compensation benefits during vacations and
holiday recesses when the only03reasonable assurance given is
for day-to-day substitute work.

B. "Between Academic Terms or Years"

Even after having determined that an employee has a reasonable assurance of returning to work "in any such capacity," the
employee will not be disqualified from receiving benefits under
the statutory language except where the employee is also
unemployed between academic terms or years.' 0 ' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Teachers Union v. Johnson0 5 held that where public school

teachers lost their jobs three weeks before the end of the academic year because of a lack of funds, they were eligible for

99.

Hutchinson v. Employment Div., 870 P.2d 847, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Wanish v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 472 N.W2d 596, 599 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991).

103.

Id.

104.
105.

See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994).
639 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1980).
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three weeks of benefits because they had a reasonable expectation that the academic year would have been three weeks
longer. 1 6 The court reasoned that since the teachers had
worked during the academic year, they could not be disqualified
from receiving benefits, even though they had a reasonable
10 7
assurance of returning to work after the summer recess.
Following Chicago Teachers Union, state courts consistently
have held that employees who are unemployed during the regular academic term or year are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits during periods between academic terms or
years.'0 8 Further, the Oregon and Michigan courts have granted
unemployment compensation benefits during those weeks of the
academic term or year when employees are not working.'0 9 The
only state supreme court that has rejected this rule is Rhode
Island's, which held that school lunch workers, unemployed as
a result of a contract dispute between the school and its teachers that delayed the opening of the school, were not eligible for
benefits."0 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island further determined that the academic year begins when school actually
starts and not before."'
The Michigan state legislature has defined the academic year
to begin when classes are first in session and to last until
students have received sufficient instruction or have earned
sufficient credit to complete academic requirements for a particular grade level or to complete instruction in a non-credit
course." 2 While other states have not statutorily defined the
academic year, generally the state courts have adopted the

106. Id. at 357.
107. Id.
108. E.g., Bonnette v. West Ottawa Pub. Sch., 419 N.W.2d 593, 599-600 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987); In re Curto, 517 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Hayes v. Employment Div., 672 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
109. E.g., Rogel v. Taylor Sch. Dist., 394 N.W.2d 32, 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985);
Hayes, 672 P.2d at 352.
110. Kachanis v. Board of Review, 638 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I. 1994).
111. Id. at 557. State courts generally consider the academic year to occur between
September and June in the elementary and secondary schools and during the fall and
spring semesters in institutions of higher education. See, e.g., Campbell v. Department
of Employment Sec., 570 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (indicating that the
"summer months" are not included in the academic year); Rogel, 394 N.W.2d at 34
(finding that the school year begins on the scheduled date of commencing classes and
not the actual date); Friedlander v. Employment Div., 676 P.2d 314, 318 (Or. Ct. App.
1983) (suggesting that the academic term for a college-level instructor would begin
during the fall term).
112. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 421.27(b)(4) (1979).
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foregoing definition and have further held that for the purposes
of unemployment compensation, the academic year excludes the
summer session,13 even
if the employee has worked during the
11 4
summer in the past.
The Court of Appeals of Washington, however, has not
adopted this definition. That court has held recently that an
employee of an educational institution is eligible for unemployment compensation benefits where the employee is unemployed
during the summer session but has a reasonable assurance of
returning to work in the fall." 5 The court concluded that diminished enrollment during the summer session provided insufficient justification for concluding
that the summer session was
16
not an academic term."
At least one Pennsylvania court similarly has held that
employees of educational institutions who are employed in other
than an instructional, research, or principal administrative
capacity are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits
if unemployed during a summer session. In Katz v. Unemployment CompensationBoardof Review117 the court reached its
holding by defining academic term as a term in which the
courses offered require the same number of course hours and
are given the same credit as those in other terms." 8 The court
reasoned that since the word "regular" does not appear before
the words "academic years or terms" in the Pennsylvania
statute 1 9 with regard to employees who are employed in other
than an instructional, research, or principal administrative
capacity, these employees are eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits if they are unemployed during any academic
20
term.

The Pennsylvania courts, however, have limited the holding
of Katz to employees not in instructional, research, or principal
administrative capacities. As in other states, instructional,

113. E.g., Campbell, 570 N.E.2d at 819; In re Alexander, 522 N.Y.S.2d 998, 999
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Sifakas, 519 N.Y.S.2d, 433, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987);
University of Toledo v. Heiny, 507 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ohio 1987).
114. E.g., School Dist. No. 21 v. Ochoa, 342 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Neb. 1984); In re
Lintz, 454 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Friedlander,676 P.2d at 317.
115. Evans v. Department of Employment Sec., 866 P.2d 687, 689 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994).
116. Id.
117. Katz v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 540 A.2d 624, 626 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988).
118. See id. at 625.
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802.1(2) (1991); see also 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii)
(1994) (providing the same language).
120. Katz, 540 A.2d at 626.
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research, or principal administrative employees who are unemployed are ineligible for benefits in Pennsylvania if they are
unemployed during the summer session. 12' The court reasoned
that since the word "regular" does appear before the word
"terms" in the Pennsylvania statute 2 2 with regard to employees
who are employed in an instructional, research, or principal
administrative capacity, these employees are ineligible for
benefits if they are unemployed during a non-regular academic
term. 2 A non-regular academic term has been defined as a
term where fewer classes are offered, where there is no distinction between full and part-time students, where there is a
significant decrease in enrollment, where there is a varying
length of course instruction,1 24and where the term is not included
on the academic calendar.

C. "Establishedor Customary Vacation
Period or Holiday Recess"

State courts have defined the phrase "established or customary vacation period or holiday recess" negatively, by stating
what it is not. For example, the Michigan courts have held that
"an established or customary vacation period or holiday recess"
125
is not a period in which employees have traditionally worked;
not a period in which a collective bargaining agreement provides that employees will work;' 2 6 not a period that varies in
length from year to year; 2v and not necessarily a period in
which students are not customarily in school. 28 Finally, a
Washington court has held that the period does not include the
summer because the summer does not occur within a term or

year. 129

121. E.g., Community College v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 634
A.2d 845 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802.1(1) (1991).
123. Community College, 634 A.2d at 848.
124. Id. at 847-48.
125. Billups v. Howell Pub. Sch., 423 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
126. Id.
127. Wilkerson v. Jackson Pub. Sch., 427 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
128. Billups, 423 N.W.2d at 233.
129. Evans v. State Dep't of Employment Sec., 866 P.2d 687, 690 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994).
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D. "EducationalInstitutions"

Employees cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits
under 26 U.S.C. § 3304 unless they work for either an educational institution or an educational service agency. 130 The FUTA
defines "educational service agency" as a governmental agency
or entity that has been established and is operated exclusively
to provide services to educational institutions.'' Section 3304,
however, does not define "educational institution."" 2 A few state
courts have considered an educational institution to be a
school. 3 3 Schools have been defined as institutions where the
primary objective is the instruction of academic skills in a
classroom setting, 134 or where there exists an organized academic course of study with instructor guidance, where students
receive academic credit, and where courses are offered on a
35
continual basis.
Courts have disagreed over whether preschool Headstart
programs qualify as educational institutions. The Texas Court
of Appeals has held that a Headstart program qualified as a
day care program and, therefore, would not be considered an
educational institution. 3 ' The Iowa Court of Appeals has held,
however, that a Headstart program is an educational institution
because it has a preschool license and teaches language, speaking, and self-expression skills. 37 The Colorado Supreme Court
has held that, where a county operates a Headstart program,
the Headstart employees were eligible for unemployment compensation benefits because the county is not an educational
1 38
institution.

130. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A) (1994).
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. E.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Board of County Comn'rs, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo.
1984); Multnomah Educ. Serv. Dist. v. Employment Div., 849 P.2d 558 (Or. Ct. App.
1993); Alexander v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 688 P.2d 516 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
134. Alexander, 688 P.2d at 525.
135. Multnomah Educ. Serv. Dist., 849 P.2d at 560.
136. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Child, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) ("[The educational aspect of the program was merely incidental to the primary

purpose of bringing the participating children to a level of social development where
they can better cope with ... primary school.").
137. Simpson v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
138. Industrial Conm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 690 P.2d 839, 847 (Colo. 1984).
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Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that where
school crossing guards have been employed by a city, rather
than by a school, the school crossing guards remain eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits.3 9 A Pennsylvania court
has held that school crossing guards remain eligible for unemployment compensation benefits because they are employed by
a borough, and the borough is not an educational institution. 4 0
Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
held that where a school bus driver is employed by a private
bus company, rather than by a school, the bus driver qualifies
for unemployment compensation benefits.' The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire has held that where a food service employee
is employed by a private profit-making corporation that provides food services to an educational institution, the employee
did not work for an educational service agency and, therefore,
the employee
remained eligible for unemployment compensation
42
benefits.

E. Year-Round Employment

Finally, state courts have been divided in their consideration
of full-time, year-round employees, such as houseparents of
educational institutions.' A Pennsylvania court has held that
full-time, year-round employees of educational institutions are
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits during periods
of unemployment.' 4 That court suggested that the federal
language regarding reasonable assurance did not apply to
employees who were not academic year or term employees."'
To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has held
that year-round employees of educational institutions are

139. City of Milwaukee v. Department of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 316
N.W.2d 367, 371 (Wis. 1982).
140. Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 440
A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
141. Town of Milton v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 438 N.E.2d 71, 72
(Mass. 1982).
142. In re Locke, 503 A.2d 754 (N.H. 1985).
143. Houseparents are year-round employees of schools that require supervision of
students in dormitories.
144. Scotland Sch. for Veterans Children v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 578 A.2d 78, 78 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
145. Id.
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ineligible for benefits when the educational institution closes for
a customary vacation period or holiday recess.14 6 That court also
decided that employees of educational institutions are not
entitled to partial benefits even when they work a few hours
during their customary vacation period or holiday recess because they had a reasonable assurance of returning to work. 147
The state courts also are divided as to whether year-round
employees who have become academic year or term employees
remain eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that, where a full-time,
year-round employee of an educational institution was laid-off
at the end of the academic year, but later offered reasonable
assurance of returning to work for the next academic year, the
employee was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.14 8 Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that a
year-round employee of an educational institution who did not
work during the summer still had a reasonable assurance of
returning to work in the same or similar capacity. 14 Also, both
the Michigan Court of Appeals and the West Virginia Supreme
Court have held that employees of educational institutions who
have a reasonable assurance of returning to work are ineligible
for benefits, even when they are not offered the summer work
they have been offered in the past. 50 However, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island has held that where a full-time, yearround employee of an educational institution involuntarily
became an academic year employee, the employee was entitled
to unemployment compensation benefits during the first summer, even though the employee had a reasonable assurance of
returning to work in the fall. 5 ' The court reasoned that the
claimants were eligible for benefits because the employees'
yearly income had been substantially reduced, the employees
had been employed year-round for a significant period of time,

146. Delicato v. Board of Review, 643 A.2d 216, 273 (R.I. 1994).
147. Id. at 223.
148. Swanson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, 484 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992). The court found the employee eligible for benefits for the period following
notification of termination and until notification of re-employment for the following
year. Id. The employee was not eligible for benefits for the period between notification
of reemployment and resumption of work. Id. at 433-34.
149. Zeek v. Employment Div., 672 P.2d 349, 350 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
150. Becotte v. Gwinn Sch., 481 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Adkins v.
Gotson, 453 S.E.2d 395, 401-02 (W. Va. 1994).
151. Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Department of Employment and Training, Bd. of
Review, 635 A.2d 266, 267 (R.I. 1993).
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the employees had received little notice of unemployment, and
because
their positions were not tailored to the academic
1 52
year.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the original goals of the Unemployment Insurance
program was to provide initial financial support for working
Americans who become unemployed through no fault of their
own.' 53 Given this intent, where employees of educational
institutions have become unemployed through no fault of their
own and where they have shown financial attachment to the
labor force, state courts should narrowly construe the FUTA's
language that denies unemployment compensation benefits.
Otherwise, employees of educational institutions will be unable
to enjoy the same kind of unemployment insurance protection
provided to management personnel in private industry."5 Yet
the courts should construe this language to eliminate the
payment of unemployment compensation benefits to employees
who are able to plan for non-working periods and who thus do
not truly suffer from the kind of economic insecurity that
unemployment compensation coverage was meant to alleviate. 5
In light of the legislative intent behind the FUTA, the states
should be encouraged by statutory amendments, regulations,
unemployment insurance program letters, and by the recommendation of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 5 ' to adopt the following interpretations of the federal
statutory language. First, "reasonable assurance" should be
defined as a written, verbal, or an implied mutual agreement
that the employee of an educational institution or service agency
will return to work following the period between two academic
years or terms, or following a vacation period or holiday recess.
Second, an offer of employment is not bona fide if only a possibility of employment exists. Therefore, state courts should
determine whether an offer of reasonable assurance is, in fact,

152. Id.
153.

ADVIsORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 1, at 3.

154. Kelly v. Employment Div., 701 P.2d 448, 451 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); S. REP. No.
752, supra note 9, at 16, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3620.
155. Haynes v. Commonwealth, 442 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
156.

ADVISORY COuNcIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 1, at 14.
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an offer of employment when the offer depends on enrollment,
program, or funding. Third, reasonable assurance "in any such
capacity" should exist only if the terms and conditions of employment offered in the second academic term or year, or after
the customary vacation period or holiday recess, are not substantially less than the terms and conditions of employment in
the first academic term or year, or prior to the customary
vacation period or holiday recess. Employees who are not
reasonably assured of employment in the same or similar
capacity should be eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits in order to satisfy the legislative intent of providing the
same unemployment compensation benefits to those in the
academic community as to those in other industries.
Fourth, the holdings of the Pennsylvania courts should be
followed by the other states to provide unemployment benefits
to employees who have received such benefits prior to a break
in academic terms or years or prior to a customary vacation
period or holiday recess, and to employees who receive benefits
based on full-time employment during the break in academic
terms or years and during the vacation period or holiday recess.
Even though these employees have a reasonable assurance of
returning to work, they clearly suffer from the kind of economic
insecurity that state unemployment compensation coverage was
meant to alleviate and, therefore, should be eligible for benefits. Fifth, state courts should define an academic term or
year as the period of time when classes are in session for the
length of time required for students to receive sufficient
instruction, or to earn sufficient credit, to complete requirements for a particular grade level, or to complete instruction
in a non-credit course. Employees of educational institutions
should be eligible for benefits during summer sessions only if
the summer session is either an academic term or part of the
academic year. Sixth, state courts should define a vacation
period or holiday recess as a regularly scheduled period that
occurs within a term and is not a period of time in which
employees traditionally have worked. Seventh, an educational
institution is a school. State courts should define an educational institution as an institution where there exists an
organized academic course of study under the guidance of an
instructor, where students receive academic credit and courses
are offered on a continuing basis. Headstart programs, cities,
boroughs, and private employers should not be considered
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educational institutions or educational service agencies. Their
employees should not be covered by the federally mandated
language because they are eligible for benefits regardless of
that language.
Finally, state courts should not consider full-time, year-round
employees of educational institutions as covered under the federal statutory language. Rather the courts should find them eligible for benefits regardless of that language.

CONCLUSION

This Article has discussed the amendments to the FUTA that
provide for the payment of unemployment compensatory benefits
to the employees of educational institutions. This Article also has
surveyed state court interpretations of the federally mandated
statutory language authorizing the payment of unemployment
compensation benefits. Finally, this Article has provided recommendations for implementing that language.
The federal government should enact statutory amendments,
regulations, or unemployment insurance program letters to
ensure that state courts interpret the federal language in accordance with the legislative intent behind the Act. In the alternative, the states themselves should cooperate and coordinate their
decisions in order to ensure consistency and equitable treatment
of similarly situated employees.

